COMMENTS
Forms of Redress for Design Piracy: How Victims
Can Use Existing Copyright Law
Peter K. Schalestock"
Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards
commensurate with the services rendered.'
Fashion designers have long been the victims of piracy by
unscrupulous competitors. Though some designers have sought
protection under copyright, patent, or trademark law, most have found
themselves without legal recourse. Congress never has provided
explicitly for the protection of clothing designs, and courts have been
unwilling to use the tools available for even limited protection.
Clothing designs do not fit neatly into the existing scheme of
intellectual property protection because they commit the cardinal sin
of being useful. Copyright law protects useful articles only to the
extent that they contain "physically or conceptually separable
elements" that are unrelated to utility.2 Trademark law does not
protect that which is "functional." ' Design patents are reserved for
the "ornamental." 4 Unlike other useful articles-a hammer or an
ironing board for example-clothes derive much of their appeal and
value from their aesthetic properties. They exist not merely to cover
and protect, but to decorate as well.
Separating the decorative, which is protectable, from the functional, which is not, is a difficult task. Unfortunately, courts and the
* Counsel, U.S. Representative Rick White; J.D. cum laude 1996, Seattle University School
of Law; B.A. 1992, University of Washington. Thanks to Catherine Romero Wright and
Professor Sidney DeLong for their thoughtful guidance and commentary.
1. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996).
3. See, e.g., International Order of Job's Daughter v. Lindeburg & Co., 727 F.2d 1087,
1091 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1996).
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U.S. Copyright Office have declined to undertake it. To achieve broad
protection, the only recourse may be for Congress to amend the
Copyright Act.5 However, the judicial and administrative refusal to
protect clothing designs is not justified by existing law, and courts
should be willing to review clothing designs for copyrightable elements.
Part I of this Comment explores the nature and scope of design
piracy in the fashion industry. It also discusses the impact of modem
technology on pirates and their victims. Part II reviews the existing
intellectual property legal framework, emphasizing copyright law and
its application to clothing design. Part III discusses the exclusion of
clothing design from copyright protection and reviews cases that have
addressed that issue. Finally, Part IV suggests ways that designers
might obtain greater protection. The alternatives explored are (1) the
proper application of existing law to find separable protectable design
elements, and (2) congressional action to include clothing designs in the
works protected by the Copyright Act.
I.

INTRODUCTION: PIRACY IN THE FASHION INDUSTRY

Design piracy permeates the clothing industry. Knockoffs "are as
plentiful as tarts in a patisserie," 6 and rampant counterfeiting in the
apparel industry is widely recognized. 7 The tactics of pirates can be
appallingly flagrant. The chairman of one American design firm
visited a Hong Kong manufacturer he was considering hiring, only to
find the factory churning out knockoffs of his company's sweaters.'
Another especially brazen pirate purchased a suit of novel and
successful design from a competitor, disassembled and copied it-then
sewed the suit back together and returned it for a refund.' The victim
of this audacity sued in federal court and lost.10 Obviously, pirates
are highly confident that they can proceed without fear of liability.
And proceed they will, for there is real money at stake. Two
major design pirates have been attributed with $50 million" and $200

5. 17 U.S.C. §101 et seq. (1996).
6. A Not-So-Little Black Dress, NEWSWEEK, June 6, 1994, at 72.
7. Protecting Your Product From Counterfeiters, BOBBIN, July 1994, at 82.
8. Copy Shops: Fashion Knockoffs Hit Stores Before OriginalsAs Designers Seethe, THE
WALL STREET JOURNAL, August 8, 1994, at Al.
9. See Johnny Carson Apparel, Inc. v. Zeeman Mfg. Co. Inc., 203 U.S.P.Q. 585, 588 (N.D.
Ga. 1978).
10. See id. at 589.
11. See Leslie J. Hagin, A Comparative Analysis of Copyright Laws Applied to Fashion
Works: Renewing the Proposalfor Folding Fashion Works Into the United States CopyrightRegime,
26 TEX. INT'L L.J. 341, 347 (1991).
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million,12 respectively, in annual revenue from their knockoff sales.
The major retailer Barneys of New York said in 1994 that its private
label merchandise accounted for thirty percent of sales, an increase of
fifty percent over five years; the Wall Street Journal tactfully says of
Barneys' private label wear that "some of [it] closely resembles the best
of the pricier designer wear. '"13 Clearly, the ability to bring in
revenue on this scale with no need for creative design work creates a
powerful incentive for copiers to continue and expand their piracy.
By making the copying process both faster and easier, modern
technology has increased the pirates' profit potential while decreasing
the difficulty of their task. The key to a design's value is its novelty.14 In the past, a designer had exclusive use of his design for a
limited time simply because of the time required for a pirate to
produce and market copies. This situation may not have been optimal
for the designer, but at least he could profit from buyers willing to pay
a premium in order to obtain the original design first. In recent years,
however, the situation has changed radically:
Now, in an age of instant global communications, high-quality
copies often reach stores before the originals, and at a fraction of the
cost....
A photograph snapped at a fashion show in Milan can be faxed
overnight to a Hong Kong factory, which can turn out a sample in
a matter of hours. That sample can be FedExed back to a New
York showroom the next day, ready for retail buyers to preview.
Stores order these lower-priced "interpretations" for their own
private-label collections even as they are showing the costlier
designer versions intheir pricier departments."5
The collapse of the time lag between creation and marketing has
eliminated one of the last ways designers could recoup the cost of
creating original works; if piracy continues to proliferate and undermine even the early sales efforts of designers, fashion houses may find
that creating designs place them at an untenable competitive disadvantage. In particular, small designers who depend primarily on their
creative work rather than their marketing muscle may be driven out of
the industry.

12.
L. REv.
13.
14.
15.

See Rocky Schmidt, Designer Law: Fashioninga Remedy for Design Piracy, 30 U.C.L.A.
861, 863 (1983).
Copy Shops, supra note 8, at Al.
See Hagin, supra note 11, at 347-48.
Copy Shops, supra note 8, at Al.
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THE PRESENT COPYRIGHT SCHEME
The reason all of this piracy is possible is that the American
intellectual property scheme does not protect clothing designs. Federal
intellectual property law includes three separate types of protection:
patent, trademark, and copyright. Patent protection can apply to
utilitarian inventions or ornamental design.16 While the latter
category might theoretically apply to clothing, the length of time
required to obtain a patent makes it an impractical source of protection.
The primary function of trademark law is to protect marks or design
features (which are known as trade dress) that primarily serve to
identify the source of goods. Trademark generally does not protect
goods themselves.17 Thus, it is copyright law that offers the most
likely avenue to protect clothing designs. Although fabric design (that
is, the pattern on a flat piece of textile) and color arrangements-both
of which are elements of clothing design--can be protected by
copyright,"8 courts 9 and the Copyright Office20 have consistently
refused to grant protection to the overall design of apparel.
The United States Constitution authorizes Congress to "promote
the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." 21 Congress has seen fit to exercise its
power to protect through copyright not only writings, but musical and
dramatic works, painting and sculpture, motion pictures, sound
Holders of copyright in a
recordings and architectural works.
protected work receive a number of exclusive rights in that work,
including the right to reproduce or distribute copies of the work.2"
Notwithstanding this broad scope, one of the most vibrantly
creative artistic arenas has been denied protection by the courts and the
Copyright Office, and repeated pleas to Congress in its behalf have
II.

16. See 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1996).
17. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115 et seq. (1996).
18. See Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer California, Inc., 937 F.2d 759, 763 (2d Cir. 1991)
(fabric); Primcot Fabrics, Dept. of Prismatic Fabrics, Inc. v. Kleinfab Corp., 368 F. Supp. 482,
484 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (color); 1 MELVILLE H. NIMMER AND DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 2.14, at 2-178.5 (1991) (hereinafter NIMMER) (color).
19. See, e.g., Jack Adelman, Inc. v. Sonners & Gordon, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 187 (S.D.N.Y.
1934).
20. See, e.g., Policy Decision, Registrability of Costume Designs, 56 Fed. Reg. 56530-02
(Nov. 5, 1991).
21. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, d. 8.
22. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1996).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (1996).
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been unavailing. Fashion designers, for whom creativity and originali-

ty are the lifeblood of success,24 remain at the mercy of pirates who
can steal their designs with impunity.
When analyzing the availability of copyright protection, the first
step is to ask whether the article for which protection is sought has an
intrinsic utilitarian function. If not, then the article is eligible for
copyright protection. If the article has a utilitarian function, then the
analysis proceeds to the search for separable copyrightable elements.
A.

The Useful Article Exception

The reason clothing designs have been excluded from copyright
protection is the "useful article" exception in the Copyright Act of
1976.2 Among the categories of work eligible for copyright protection, the one most likely to apply to clothes is "pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works." 2 The definition of such works includes "works of
artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or
utilitarian aspects are concerned. '2 7 However, the Act states that
the design of a useful article, as defined in this section,28 shall be
considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only
to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are
capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the
article.29
According to the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act, the
purpose of excluding useful articles from copyright protection was "to
draw as clear a line as possible between copyrightable works of applied

art and uncopyrightable works of industrial design." '30 Examples of

24. According to attorney Francine Summa, who represented Yves Saint Laurent in a design
piracy case, "each time a piece is copied, its value diminishes. From the moment the clientele
sees a dress everywhere, they lose interest." A Ruling by French Court Finds Copyrightin a Design,
N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1994, at D4; see also Hagin, supra note 11, at 347-48 ("In the fashion
industry, style-rather than wear and durability-is the dominant competitive factor," citing
Weikart, Design Piracy, 19 IND. L.J. 235, 256 (1944)).
25. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (1996).
27. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
28. A "useful article" is defined in the Act as: "[A]n article having an intrinsic utilitarian
function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information." Id.
29. Id.
30. H.R. REP. No. 1476, at 55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668.
Industrial designs may be the subject of a design patent. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1996). However, this
is of little help to fashion designers because "designs and patterns usually are short-lived and with
the conditions and time incidental to obtaining the patent, this protection comes too late, if at all."
Jack Adelman, Inc. v. Sonners & Gordon, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 187, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
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uncopyrightable works cited in the legislative history include "the
airplane, ladies' dress, food processor, [or]
shape of an automobile,
31
set."
television
The inclusion of "ladies' dress" in this list of examples might at
first seem to indicate that Congress explicitly intended to foreclose
copyright protection for clothing designs. However, the items listed
are not per se uncopyrightable; they still may receive copyright
protection if they contain "some element that, physically or conceptually, can be identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of the
article."32 The 1976 amendments to the Copyright Act explicitly
codified the U.S. Supreme Court's 1954 holding in Mazer v. Stein,33
the leading case on the protection of useful articles. 4
B.

SeparabilityAnalysis

The plaintiff in Mazer manufactured a lamp whose base consisted
The statuette, without any lamp components
of a statuette.
included, had been registered by the Copyright Office.36 The
defendant sold lamps embodying copies of the statuettes.3 7 The
defendant challenged the validity of the copyright in a38work of art that
was intended to be incorporated into a useful article.
The Court first established that the statuettes standing alone could
be considered works of art eligible for copyright protection. 9 Next,
answering the defendant's contention that the lamps were an industrial
design subject to design patent protection, the Court stated that
eligibility for patent did not preclude copyright protection.4 ° The
"art" in Mazer was an integral part of the physical structure of the
lamp. Thus, Mazer stands as an example of the "conceptual separabil-

31. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 30, at 55 (emphasis added).
32. See, e.g., definitions of "pictorial, graphic and sculptural" works and definition of
"useful article" contained in Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996).

33. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
34. See 17 U.S.C. § 101; see also Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217.
35. See id. at 202.
36. See id. at 202-03.
37. See id. at 203.
38. See id. at 205.
39. See id. at 213.
40. The defendant's argument was that patent applications are subject to greater scrutiny
than those for copyrights and include a requirement of novelty, so allowing a designer to obtain
a monopoly over a useful article without the process of patent examination would hinder
commerce. In rejecting the argument, the Court noted that a design patent grants a monopoly
over the use of the patented item, while a copyright only prevents copying. Id. at 217.
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ity" from utilitarian function that may support copyrightable subject
matter. 4
Since the 1976 Copyright Act, courts have attempted with varying
success to clarify when a useful article contains "physically or
conceptually separable" copyrightable elements. In one of the first
cases to explore the application of this question to apparel, the Second
Circuit in Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories By Pearl, Inc. 41 looked at
ornamental belt buckles, which were "on a razor's edge of copyright
law.'43 Although belt buckles clearly serve a utilitarian purpose, the
court found that the designs were conceptually separable works of art
and upheld the Copyright Office grant of registration." The buckles
were found to "rise to the level of creative art" and met the "basic
requirements of originality and creativity." 45 No doubt the court was
aided in its decision by the fact that the Metropolitan Museum of Art
had accepted the buckles for its permanent collection.4 6
Although the test applied by the court was conceptual separability,
except for affirming the validity of that test, the decision stands for
little beyond an artistic judgment.47 In effect, the court seemed to say
that any useful design of sufficient creativity and aesthetic appeal to be
considered "art" contains separable elements that can be copyrighted.
While true, this gives little guidance as to what, beyond aesthetic
judgment, is involved in making the determination.
Recognizing the shortcomings of the Kieselstein-Cordstandard, the
Second Circuit in Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co.4"
refined the test for conceptual separability as follows:
[I]f design elements reflect a merger of aesthetic and functional
considerations, the artistic aspects of a work cannot be said to be
conceptually separable from the utilitarian elements. Conversely,
where design elements can be identified as reflecting the designer's
artistic judgment exercised independently of functional influences,
conceptual separability exists.49

41. See NIMMER, supra note 18, § 2.08[B], at 2-101.
42. 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
43. Id. at 990.
44. See id. at 993.
45. Id. at 994.
46. See id. at 991.
47. The Copyright Office also acknowledges the validity of conceptual separability as
distinct from physical. See Compendium II of Copyright Office Practices § 505.02 (1984).
48. 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
49. Id. at 1145.
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Applying this test to a bicycle rack derived from an original artistic
design, the court found that the rack was the uncopyrightable product
of industrial design because the designer had adapted the original
aesthetic elements to further the rack's utilitarian purpose."0
By focusing on the creative process rather than on the result, the
Brandir approach may appear to make the application of conceptual
separability far narrower than what the Supreme Court called for in
Mazer. If any functional influence whatsoever on the design process
disqualifies the work for protection, then even the lamp bases in Mazer
probably would not have been copyrightable because their design could
have been influenced in some way by their functional role.51 Thus,
the Brandir test seems inconsistent with the Supreme Court's application of the law, and narrower than the proper standard.
C. Current Issues Regarding Protection of Useful Articles
Although the Copyright Act is clear that useful articles cannot be
copyrighted as to their useful aspects, the Act provides relatively little
guidance on how to draw the distinction between what is useful and
what is not. The need for making this distinction comes in part from
the need to keep copyright (writings and art) and patent (inventions
However, there are some
and discoveries) protection separate."
articles-clothes being an excellent example-which are extremely
useful in many respects, yet which also have important aesthetic
aspects. Clothes generally do not meet the standards for patent
protection, 53 but the existence of their useful traits makes copyright
protection difficult as well. Thus, clothes exist in a nether world
between intellectual property schemes.
Because so much economic activity in the United States today
involves entertainment and amusement, the conventional notion of
"utility" may be ripe for re-examination.
Its original meaning
apparently referred to mechanical or transformative processes, but that
definition may not fit current economic reality and the changing needs
for intellectual property protection.

50. See id. at 1147.
51. See Shim Perlmutter, Conceptual Separability and Copyright in the Designs of Useful
Articles, 37 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 339, 372-373 (1990).
52. The scope of the two schemes must be separate because of the different types of
protection they afford. Copyright protects only against copying, not independent creation. 17
U.S.C. § 106 (1996). Patent prevents any manufacture, use, or sale of the protected article, even
if created independently. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1996).
53. Patent protection requires novelty and nonobviousness. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-03 (1996).
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III.

EXCLUSION OF CLOTHING DESIGNS FROM
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION

Cases Considering the Copyrightability of Clothing
The federal courts have struggled with copyright protection for
clothing since 1934, when the court in Jack Adelman, Inc. v. Sonners
& Gordon, Inc.," confronted a "fundamental and important" question: "Does the copyright of a drawing of a dress give the owner of
that copyright the exclusive monopoly to produce the dress itself?. 5
Analyzing the issue under the 1909 Copyright Act, the court answered
in the negative for two reasons: (1) because copyright in the design
drawing did not bar production of the dress, but only copying of the
design; and (2) because the dress itself could not be copyrighted.56
The first conclusion is subject to some debate; 7 the discussion
throughout this article assumes that either registration of the design
would protect against copying of the dress, or that the dress itself could
be and was registered.
The second conclusion, that the dress itself could not be copyrighted, was based upon a Copyright Office regulation governing
registration of works of art (the precursor to the current "pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work" scheme).58 The court said,
A.

The dress itself could hardly be classed as a work of art and filed in
the Register's office. Moreover, the regulation just quoted lists
"garments" among those articles in which "The exclusive right to
make and sell . . . should not be sought by copyright registration.". . . It follows that plaintiffs copyright gives it the exclusive

right to make copies or reprints of the drawing only, and that it
gives the copyright owner no monopoly of the article illustrated. 9

54. 112 F. Supp. 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
55. Id. at 188.
56. See id. at 189-90.
57. For example, in testimony on proposed changes to protection of architectural works, the
Register of Copyrights contended that "where a three-dimensional work meets the standard for
protection, infringement may lie regardless of whether access to the three-dimensional work is
obtained from a two-dimensional or three-dimensional depiction thereof." H.R. REP. No. 101735, at 19, repinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6950; contra NIMMER, supra note 18, § 2.08[H]
at 2-146 (distinguishing between copying for explanation and for use); Russell v. Trimfit, Inc.,
428 F. Supp. 91, 94-95 (E.D. PA. 1977) (denying copyright protection for "toe socks" on the
basis that copyright of the design drawings did not prevent manufacture of the socks depicted in
the drawings).
58. Adelman, 112 F. Supp. at 189-90.
59. Id. at 188.
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The court also quoted a letter from the Register of Patents in response
to an inquiry from a dress designer. The Register stated that copyright
law did not protect dresses, but that a design patent, under the proper
circumstances, could be obtained.6 °
The Adelman decision, whatever its merits sixty years ago, has
been superseded by developments in copyright law in three respects.
First, it was decided under a regulation that specifically precluded
registering garments, and that regulation was superseded by the 1976
Copyright Act. 6' Second, the decision depended heavily on avoiding
a grant of "monopoly" to a manufacturer of useful articles.62 The
Supreme Court dramatically undercut this rationale in Mazer v. Stein,
noting that while patent protection grants an exclusive right to the idea
disclosed in the patent, copyright only prevents copying the particular
expression of an idea.63 Thus, the holder of a copyright in a dress
could only prevent others from copying his dress, not from making
similar or identical dresses of independent creation. Finally, Adelman
pre-dates both Mazer v. Stein and the 1976 Copyright Act, which
together brought the notion of physical or conceptual separability into
copyright law. The absence of separability analysis when Adelman was
decided is critical, because, as discussed below,64 the key question in
copyrightability of dress designs is whether or not there are physically
or conceptually separable copyrightable elements. Adelman did not
perform a separability analysis and it should not dictate the outcome
of current copyright decisions.
More recently, the court in Aldridge v. Gap, Inc.6" dismissed a
complaint for copying children's wear because, "[a]s numerous cases
have recognized, although they fall within the subject matter of
copyright regulation, clothes, as useful articles, are not copyrightable."6 6 The court did not even acknowledge that separable elements
of useful articles might be copyrightable.
The Copyright Office referred to the fashion design issue in 1991
when it issued a Policy Decision on the registrability of costume
designs.67 In that decision, the Copyright Office said, "[g]arments are
useful articles, and the designs of such garments are generally outside

60. See id. at 189.
61. See id. at 188.
62. See id.
63. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217-18.
64. See discussion, infia Part III.
65. 866 F. Supp. 312 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
66. Id. at 313-14.
67. 56 Fed. Reg. 56530-02 (Nov. 5, 1991).
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of the copyright law." 68 Although it seems uncontroversial that most
garments are useful articles, 69 there may be exceptions. For example,
in Poe v. Missing Persons,7 ° the Ninth Circuit confronted a "swimsuit"
made of clear plastic filled with crushed rock.7 1 The district court
had granted summary judgment for the defendants on the basis that
the "swimsuit" was a useful article not subject to copyright protection.72 The creator of the swimsuit argued that it was artwork, not
clothing, and the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that there was a
disputed issue of material fact as to whether the object was a utilitarian
article of clothing or a work of art. 3 The defendants' evidence of the
object's usefulness consisted of a photograph of a woman wearing it;
there was no evidence that it actually could be used as a swimsuit.74
The bemused court said,
Nothing in our legal training qualifies us to determine as a matter
of law whether Aquatint No. 5 can be worn as an article of clothing

for swimming or any other utilitarian purpose. We are also unable
to determine merely by looking at Poe's creation whether a person
wearing this object can move, walk, swim, sit, stand, or lie down
without unwelcome or unintended exposure.7"

Indeed, given that the object was filled with crushed rock, one wonders
if it might have been more "useful" as an anchor than a swimsuit.
Poe raises two important points. First, given the bizarre nature
of what sometimes passes for high fashion, there may be a legitimate
issue even as to the threshold question of utility. Some of the
responses to the Copyright Office's solicitations of comments for its
1991 policy decision noted the difficulty that this threshold issue poses
in fashion design. The New York Patent, Trademark and Copyright
Law Association noted that, by asking how the separability analysis
should be applied to garment or costume designs, the Copyright Office
presupposed utility (absent utility, copyright protection is afforded to
the entire work and no separability analysis is required).76 Professor
William Fryer of the University of Baltimore School of Law observed
that, "what some persons consider a costume is another person's

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
See also Compendium II of Copyright Office Practices § 505.01 (1984).
745 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1984).
See id. at 1241.
See id. at 1241.
See id. at 1243.
See id. at 1241-42.
Id. at 1242.

76. Comment on file at the U.S. Copyright Office, docket no. RM 90-7.
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ordinary wear."" Attorney Andrew Langsam echoed this sentiment,
and attached publications which he said "show that costumes and
clothing designs are indistinguishable." 7 Even if clothes are useful
and costumes are not, deciding whether a given article is one or the
other is a difficult process.
The second important point raised by Poe is that conceding utility
only begins the analysis, because the crucial step is determining
whether there are physically or conceptually separable copyrightable
elements.79 Most of the parties submitting comments took the
position that costumes are not useful. Attorney David Gryce then
tried to explain how to analyze the utility of clothing:
[F]or example, dresses and shirts, jackets and pants which owe their
shape to how those garments are worn on the human body would
be useful articles. To the extent there are shapes which are
independent of the human body shape (beyond mere accentuation
of a feature, such as padded shoulders), the article is "soft sculpture" and is copyrightable.80
The criterion proposed by Gryce suggests one idea for implementing
the "physical or conceptual separability" test of copyright law.
B. Costumes and Conceptual Separability
Although cases applying separability to clothing are virtually
nonexistent, the analysis has been used to evaluate the copyrightability
of costumes. Two leading cases, National Theme Productions, Inc. v.
Jerry B. Beck, Inc."1 and Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie's Costumes Co.,
Inc.,82 reached diametrically opposite results. The Copyright Office
chose to follow the minimalist approach to separability.
In National Theme Productions,the district court took seriously the
statutory charge to evaluate the existence of separable copyrightable
subject matter. The plaintiff manufactured Halloween and masquerade
costumes. It claimed a copyright in aspects of four costumes: (1)
Rabbit In Hat (which did not allow the wearer to sit or recline, and
required the wearer to don additional clothing because of sheer fabric
used in some portions); (2) Tigress (which could not be worn without
a separate body covering underneath it); (3) Magic Dragon (in which

77. Id.
78. Id.

79.
80.
81.
82.

Because of its procedural posture, Poe did not reach this question.
Connent on file at the U.S. Copyright Office, docket no. RM 90-7.
696 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D. Cal. 1988).
721 F. Supp. 1566 (E.D. N.Y. 1989).
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copyright was claimed only for the hood and tailpiece as wearable
toys); and (4) Pampered Pup (protection claimed for the entire design
as an integrated ensemble depicting an animated stuffed animal)."
The court's opinion recognized that the costumes had an intrinsic
utilitarian function as clothing, but then acknowledged the analysis
prescribed by the Copyright Act:
The costumes are copyrightable, if at all, to the extent that they
have features which can be identified separately and are capable of
existing independently as a work of art. The features only need be
conceptually separable from the utilitarian functions of the garments
to be entitled to protection under copyright law. 4
The court adopted the test for conceptual separability established by
the Second Circuit in Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber."5
Applying that test, the court said:
The costumes at issue here are comprised of garments and/or
accessory items. They lie on the margin of utility. Their primary
purpose is to permit the wearer to masquerade. They are held to be
useful articles nonetheless, because they are made up of items which
are meant to be worn ....
The costumes were not, however,
designed to optimize their function as clothing.
The costumes' design and form have little to do with their
suitability as wearing apparel....
... The costumes' artistic features simply do not advance
their utilitarian purpose as clothing or accessories.8 6
The court carefully considered the precise aspects of the costumes
claimed for copyright protection, and found them to "reflect unfettered
artistic license. "87
The National Theme opinion is an exemplary application of the
conceptual separability standard, and it resulted in copyright protection
for some highly stylized designs.
However, Whimsicality, following shortly after National Theme,
reached exactly the opposite conclusion. In Whimsicality, the district
court undertook the separability analysis, but preordained its conclusion by a preliminary choice of definition. The court said the
costumes in question were not useful merely as clothing, but "[t]heir
purpose is more specialized; it is to enable the wearer to masquerade,

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See National Theme, 696 F. Supp. at 1349-51.
Id. at 1352 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1353; see supra text accompanying note 49.
National Theme, 696 F. Supp. at 1353-54 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1354.
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to pretend to be a jack o'lantern or a bee or a spider.""8 The court
dismissed the very possibility of separable elements when it said, "the
aesthetically very pleasing shapes of Mr. Couture's creations ... are
inseparable from the utilitarian function of the objects of which they
are a part. .. ."9
This approach effectively writes the notion of conceptually
separable copyrightable elements out of the law. It equates the
entertainment provided by the costume with its utility. Criticizing the
Whimisicality opinion, one commentator described the comment on
aesthetics as "remarkable language-the 'function' of decoration being
precisely what is ordinarily conceived of as protected by copyright."9 °
The Whimsicality court's approach also ignored the statutory definition
of useful article, which includes only articles whose "utilitarian
function ... is not merely to portray the appearance of the article." 9 '
The Whimsicality court's approach to separability is strikingly
similar to the "aesthetic functionality" doctrine found in trademark and
trade dress law. That doctrine originated in 1952, when the Ninth
Circuit said in Pagliero v. Wallace China Co. 92 that because the
aesthetic features of the china in question were important to its
commercial success, they were a "functional" part of the product.93
The aesthetic functionality doctrine has been repeatedly criticized and
rejected, even by the Ninth Circuit itself,94 because "[r]elating
functionality to the commercial desirability of the feature regardless of
its utilitarian function discourages the development of appealing
designs because such designs would be entitled to less protection. '
The Second Circuit repeated the district court's error when it
heard Whimsicality on appeal.9 6 The court said, "clothes are particularly unlikely to [contain separable, copyrightable elements]-the very
decorative elements that stand out being intrinsic to the decorative
function of clothing. '97 Like the district court, the Second Circuit
effectively revived a long-discredited doctrine. In doing so, the court

88. Whimsicality, 721 F. Supp. at 1574.
89. Id. at 1575-76. The court also criticized the National Theme court because it "failed to
assess the artistic elements in light of the costumes' purpose as masquerade clothing." Id. at 1575
(italics in original).
90. Perlmutter, supra note 51, at 370.
91. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996).
92. 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952).
93. Id. at 344.
94. See Vuitton et ffls S.A. v. J. Young Ents., Inc., 644 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1981).
95. Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1246 (6th Cir. 1991).
96. 891 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1989).
97. Id. at 455 (emphasis added).
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cut off the conceptual separability analysis before the analysis could
begin. It should be noted, however, that the Second Circuit's
comments on this question constitute dictum because the basis for its
decision in the case was that the plaintiff had committed fraud on the
Copyright Office.9"
Like aesthetic functionality, the Whimsicality approach to
conceptual separability should be rejected. Realism, and hence
effectiveness as a masquerade costume, may be totally unrelated to
aesthetic appeal. The Whimsicality court's logic would preclude
protection for stylistic architectural design, since part of the "function"
of a building is to make people want to occupy it and aesthetic appeal
serves that purpose. For that matter, in any artistic medium whose
function is to "entertain" (e.g., television, music, cinema), the very
artistic choices that comprise the work also support its "function."
The logical result of the choices made in Whimsicality is to undermine
the entire copyright scheme by declaring all artistic and creative work
utilitarian.
Or, perhaps more broadly stated, the result is to merge utilitarian
and artistic designs into a single group. In some respects, the
"utilitarian" distinction may have less economic meaning today than
in the past. For example, a Mickey Mouse costume worn by a
Disneyland employee is as much a part of the process by which Disney
generates its income as is the robot assembling cars for Ford on an
assembly line. On the other hand, the same Mickey Mouse costume
worn by a child on Halloween has no "economic" utility. The current
state of the law relies on the nature of an article rather than its use; an
article that performs some physical process is utilitarian, while one that
appeals to the senses or intellect is not. In an economy where
entertainment and knowledge are dominant forces, that distinction may
be outdated. Nonetheless, it remains the best one available.
In the wake of National Theme and Whimsicality, the Copyright
Office solicited comments on the question of whether costumes should
be eligible for copyright protection.99 The Office received twelve
comments, primarily from costume and garment manufacturers. 0 °
The Office issued a policy decision announcing that it would examine
fanciful costumes for separable copyrightable elements, but garments

98. "Appellant argues that although clothing may not be copyrightable, masquerade
costumes are an exception to that general rule. In view of our disposition of this matter we need
not address that contention." Id. at 455.
99. See Notice of Inquiry, 56 Fed. Reg. 20241 (May 2, 1991).
100. Comments on file at the U.S. Copyright Office, docket no. RM 90-7.
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(including period and historical dress and uniforms) would be per se
unregistrable. 10 '
In its policy decision, the Copyright Office declared that the law
regarding garment designs was clear and that "[p]arties who wish to
10 2
modify this position must address their concerns to Congress.
While Congressional action may be appropriate or even desirable, 10 3
the law is "clear" only insofar as courts have refused to apply it by
declining to search for separable elements in clothing designs.
IV.

How DESIGNERS CAN SEEK GREATER PROTECTION
A.

Using Existing Law

Designers can assert their rights under existing law by focusing on
the separable, protectable elements of their designs and by aggressively
asserting their rights to protection in the Copyright Office and in the
courts. There is clear and extensive precedent allowing designers to
protect fabric designs and color combinations, and some designers have
used this law effectively."° Indeed, many of the separable copyrightable elements that might be found in fashion designs will consist of
fabric designs and color combinations, and can be reached under the
existing (erroneous) limitations.
Designers who believe their designs include conceptually separable
copyrightable elements, but who are refused registrations by the
Copyright Office, may challenge the refusal in court. Even before a
designer believes an infringement has occurred, she may seek review
of the Copyright Office's denial of registration under the Administrative Procedure Act."0 5 The designer following this course will
bear a heavy burden, however, since the court will overturn the
Copyright Office decision only if it was arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion.0 6 Courts generally grant the Copyright Office

101. See Policy Decision, Registrability of Costume Designs, 56 Fed. Reg. 56530-02 (Nov.
5, 1991).
102. Id.
103. See infra Part IV.
104. See, e.g., Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir.
1959); Marisa Christina, Inc. v. Bernard Chaus, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Mister
B Textiles, Inc. v. Woodcrest Fabrics, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see also Copy
Shops, supra note 8, at Al (in one year, Marisa Christina, Inc. served papers on 30 alleged copiers,
keeping knockoffs out of stores in each case).
105. See 17 U.S.C. § 701(d) (1996); see also Nova Stylings, Inc. v. Ladd, 695 F.2d 1179,
1181-82 (9th Cir. 1983).
106. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1977).
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broad discretion to decide what is eligible for copyright protection.' °7
However, because the Copyright Office relies so heavily on case law in
denying protection for clothing designs, and because that case law can
be shown to be either outdated (preceding Mazer and the 1976
Copyright Act) or erroneous (declining to follow the procedure of
separability analysis), one can make a strong argument to overturn the
Copyright Office decision.
Normally, registration is a prerequisite to an action for copyright
infringement.'08 Nonetheless, a designer who believes her designs
already have been infringed may sue under the Copyright Act
notwithstanding the denial of registration, provided that the Copyright
Office is served with notice and a copy of the complaint.' 9 Once
again, if the designs support an argument for finding conceptually
separable copyrightable elements, the law supports an argument that
the court should overrule the Copyright Office.
B.

Seeking CongressionalAction

Given the intransigence of the courts and the Copyright Office on
the issue of clothing designs, congressional action may be required in
order to expand copyright protection. Indeed, even if clothing designs
were protected under the current legal framework, only those rare
designs exotic enough to survive the conceptual separability analysis
would be affected, and that might be a small part of the overall
industry.
Despite repeated attempts, Congress has consistently refused to
bring clothing designs explicitly within copyright coverage." 0 This
is particularly odd in light of the hundreds of millions of dollars
involved in clothing design piracy."' Congress has amended the law
to protect other industries (including sound recordings and semiconductors) that have suffered comparatively smaller losses from pira12
cy. 1
Whether or not Congress acts will be at least partly driven by the
implications for international trade, which plays an increasingly

107. See, e.g., Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Gemveto
Jewelry Co., Inc. v. Jeff Cooper, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 319, 329-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
108. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1996).
109. See id.; see also Gemveto Jewelry, 568 F. Supp. at 329.
110. See Hagin, supra note 11, at 347; Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial
Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 708 n.6
(1983); Aldridge, 866 F. Supp. at 315 (N.D. Texas 1994).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
112. See Hagin, supra note 11, at 346-47.
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important role in the U.S. intellectual property regime. Recent
examples include the changes to patent terms as part of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,113 and the addition of architectural
works to the categories of works protected by copyright to ensure
compliance with the Berne Convention." 4
European countries
generally provide higher levels of protection for clothing designs than
does the United States." 5 On the other hand, the parties in Whimsicality suggested that international trade was the very reason why
American copyright protection of clothing designs is so weak-it
allowed American manufacturers to knock off European designs with
impunity." 6 Another impact occurs in the way designers seek to
protect their work. Attorney Howard MacCord suggested in his
comment to the Copyright Office that the absence of copyright
protection for designs has encouraged fashion manufacturers to protect
their works from lower-cost foreign imitation through tariffs and
7
quotas."
Ideally, before it decides whether to extend copyright protection
to clothing, Congress should conduct a factual inquiry into the actual
impact of current practices. If that inquiry shows that creation of new
designs is impaired, or that American designers are suffering at the
hands of foreign imitators, Congress should amend the law. On the
other hand, it may appear that designers are able to recoup their design
costs by marketing to high-end consumers while pirates target other
market segments, resulting in no negative impact on manufacturers and
expansion of the products available to consumers.
Within the fashion industry, opinion on the desirability of
changing the Copyright Act to cover clothing designs surely will be
mixed."' Firms that rely on creative designs will probably support
expanded protection, while those that thrive on piracy will oppose it.
Large manufacturing houses may disagree with small design shops.
The resulting lack of industry consensus might well doom any
meaningful congressional action.

113. See Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 532 (Dec. 8, 1994).
114. See Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 701 et seq. (Dec. 1, 1990).
115. See Hagin, supra note 11, at 370 (describing English and French copyright protection
for fashion works); see also A Ruling By French Court, supra note 24, at D4 (discussing large
judgment in France for infringement of clothing design).
116. See Whimsicality, 721 F. Supp. at 1572 n.7.
117. Comment on file at the U.S. Copyright Office, docket no. RM 90-7.
118. Although most of the comments submitted when the Copyright Office reviewed its
policy on costume copyrightability favored expanded protection, several designers and their
counsel opposed any change in the current practice of refusing to register costume designs. See
comments on file at Copyright Office, Docket No. RM 90-7.
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V.

CONCLUSION

The line between art and apparel can be a fine one. In Poe, the
Ninth Circuit ordered a trial to decide whether a work was art or
clothing." 9 Although it may be easier to say that costumes have
elements that are separable from their functional features, some exotic
fashion designs surely are no more functional and share the shortcomings in clothing utility that influenced the courts in Poe and National
Theme. Even if there are no separable elements, the law requires
courts to consider and conduct the analysis, and this they have declined
to do (except for National Theme). The effect on clothing designs is
clear. As the district court in Whimsicality said, "logically applied,
National Theme would extend copyright protection and monopoly
status to the high fashion designs of the garment industry."' 2 °
Whether or not one agrees that this outcome is desirable, it is
logical-and it is inescapable that National Theme was the correct
application of the existing law.
The existing copyright laws do not support the almost universal
denial of copyright protection to fashion designers. If courts continue
to avoid the hard analytic work of looking for separable elements that
are protectable, the only hope for designers may be action by Congress.
However, even absent changes in the law, designers are entitled to
greater protection under existing law than they have received. For
someone, hopefully, that potential will be worth the risk and litigation
cost.

119. See Poe, 745 F.2d 1238; see supra text accompanying notes 70-73.
120. Whimsicality, 721 F. Supp. at 1575.

